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Jacob A. Frenkel, Assaf Razin, and Steve Symansky 
Tax policies have profound effects on the temporal composition and on the 
intertemporal evolution of  the macro economy. They influence saving and 
investment decisions of households and firms as well as decisions governing 
labor supply and  demand.  With  integrated world  markets for  goods  and 
capital, the effects of tax policies undertaken by a single country spill over to 
the rest of the world. Recognition of such international economic interdepen- 
dence stimulated interest in the international coordination of fiscal policies, in 
general, and of tax policies and tax reforms, in particular. The purpose of this 
paper  is  to  highlight key  issues  pertinent  for  the  understanding of  some 
international effects of domestic tax policies and of international tax harmo- 
nization. 
The analytical framework used in the paper adopts the saving-investment 
balance approach to the analysis of international economic interdependence. 
It thus emphasizes the effects of  changes in the time profile of  the various 
taxes on  the  intertemporal  allocations of  savings,  investment,  and  labor. 
These dynamic effects are supplemented by the more conventional effects of 
the level of taxes on the margins governing labor-leisure choice (such as the 
negative effect of consumption and income taxes on labor supply). In order 
to gain some feel for the magnitudes involved,  we  present in section 6.1 
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stylized facts on  the time profile of  average consumption and  income tax 
rates for the  seven major industrial countries. These stylized facts reveal 
large international diversity of tax rates and tax structures. They also reveal 
the significant changes that took place over time in some of the countries. 
In  section 6.2,  we  present  the  basic  international-intertemporal model. 
The  model,  grounded  on  microeconomic foundations,  is  neoclassical  in 
nature and is suitable therefore for the analysis of the incentive effects of tax 
policies. It allows for rich tax structures and contains a detailed specification 
of  public- and private-sector behavior. The various economies are integrated 
through both  goods and  capital markets. Our formulation focuses on  the 
roles played by taxes on income and consumption (value-added) as well as 
by a unified international market for capital. 
In section 6.3, we apply the analytical framework to an examination of the 
international implications of  tax harmonization. In this context, we  analyze 
the  consequences  of  revenue-neutral  conversions  between  income  and 
consumption (VAT)  tax systems. Reflecting our emphasis on  the  saving- 
investment balance, we  demonstrate that the effects of  such changes in  the 
composition of  taxes depend critically on international differences in saving 
and  investment propensities, which in turn govern the time profile of  the 
current account of  the balance  of  payments. The key  results are derived 
analytically and  are also illustrated by  means of  dynamic simulations. In 
section 6.4, we shift the focus of analysis from the composition of  taxes to 
the timing of  taxes. We  thus  examine the  international effects of  budget 
deficits and public-debt management. We  demonstrate analytically as well as 
by  means of  dynamic  simulations that  these effects depend  critically  on 
whether the government manages its deficit through alterations in income or 
consumption taxes. 
In section 6.5, we combine the analytical framework of section 6.2 with the 
key elements of the analysis in sections 6.3 and 6.4 to examine the effects of 
international tax harmonization. The impetus to such an examination is pro- 
vided by the discussions surrounding  the tax harmonization measures (notably 
the VAT) associated with the move toward the single market of Europe of 1992. 
The main results conform with those obtained from the analysis of revenue- 
neutral tax conversions. Accordingly, it is shown that the saving-investment 
balance approach is useful for the analysis of the effects of  international tax 
harmonization. Specifically, the dynamic simulations demonstrate that these 
effects depend critically on the intercountry differences in saving and invest- 
ment propensities. These differences underlie the current account position and 
its evolution over time. The paper ends with concluding remarks. The appendix 
that follows the main text presents the details of the simulation model. 
6.1  Average Tax Rates in Major Industrial Countries 
In this section, we present stylized facts concerning (average) tax rates in 
the  seven  major  industrial countries: Canada,  the  United  States,  Japan, 213  International Spillovers of Taxation 
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France,  Germany,  Italy,  and  the  United  Kingdom.  Since  we  focus  our 
theoretical and  simulation analysis on  changes  over  time  of  income  and 
consumption  taxes,  we  attempt  to  present  here  some  measures  of  the 
evolution of these tax rates. 
It  is important,  however,  to  start with a word of  caution: the marginal 
tax rates relevant for the analysis of  investment, savings, and labor supply 
are  relatively  clear  as  a  conceptual  matter.  In  practice,  however,  owing 
to  the  complexity  of  the  tax  code  involving  progressivity  of  taxes, 
exemptions, tax credits,  tax evasion,  delays and advances in payments of 
taxes,  and the like,  the empirical counterparts to the conceptual marginal 
tax rates are less clear. Owing to intercountry differences in the tax code 
in  the factors underlying tax  collections and in  the relative share of  state 
and local governments in total tax revenue, the international comparison of 
tax  rates  is  even  more  complex.  Keeping  these  empirical  difficulties in 
mind,  we  nevertheless  attempt  to  highlight  some  key  features  of 
intercountry differences in consumption and income tax rates. In calculating 
the  various tax  rates,  we  divide the general government tax-revenue data 
from  OECD (1987a) by  a  corresponding computed tax  base  from OECD 
(1987b).  We  thus  generate  series  of  average  tax  rates  for  the  major 
industrial countries. 
Figure 6.1 exhibits the total tax rate for the period 1973-86.*  It highlights 
the international diversity of this measure of  the tax burden. While in Japan 
and the United States the total tax rate is less than 30 percent by  1986, the 
rest of  the OECD are substantially higher, reaching close to 45  percent in 
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France. The other noteworthy  feature apparent in figure 6.1 is the different 
degree of variability of this measure of tax rates over time. For example, while 
for some countries (e.g., Italy, France, and Japan) this measure of tax rates 
exhibits a positive trend, for other countries such a trend is less pronounced. 
While the  total tax rate provides  some information regarding the overall 
tax  burden,  the  key  decisions  concerning  investment,  saving,  and  labor 
supply depend on the detailed composition of  taxes.  Our main focus in this 
paper  is  on  consumption  and  income  taxes.  We  turn  next,  therefore,  to 
examine more detailed information. Figure 6.2 exhibits the consumption tax 
rate. As is evident, the highest measure of the consumption tax rate prevails 
in France  (about  15 percent),  while  the  lowest  prevails  in  Japan  and  the 
United  States  (about  3 percent).  The figure  also reveals  the  upward  trend 
(during the  1980s) prevailing  in Canada,  Italy,  and  the  United  Kingdom, 
whose rate has risen to about 10 percent (the rate prevailing in Germany). In 
this  context, the  sharp  increase  in  the  U.K.  tax  rate  associated  with  the 
decision  in  1979 to  nearly  double  the  value-added  tax  rate  is  especially 
noteworthy.  The intra-European differences in the consumption tax rates are 
of  special relevance in view of the VAT  harmonization proposals  associated 
with the plans for Europe of  1992. 
Figures  6.3-6.5  exhibit  various  measures  of  income  tax  rates.  The 
personal  income  tax  rates  shown  in  figure  6.3  reveal  the  international 
diversity. The highest rate prevails in Canada (about 22 percent),  while the 
lowest rate  prevails  in  France  (about  10  percent).  Also  noteworthy  is the 
upward trend in the Italian personal income tax rate. 
The  income  tax  rates  shown  in  figure  6.4  include  both  personal  and 
corporate  taxes.  Based  on  this  measure,  the  highest  tax  rates  prevail  in 
Canada and the United Kingdom. The height of the U.K. tax rate reflects its 
relatively high corporate income tax. The lowest tax rate (about 10 percent) 
prevails  in  France.  The significant decline  of  this  measure  in  1982 in  the 
United  States  reflects  the  sharp  fall  in  the  corporate  income  tax  rates 
associated with the Tax Act of  198  1. 
The role of the social security and payroll tax rates and the internationally 
diversity thereof  is presented  in figure 6.5. We  first note the upward  trend 
prevailing in all major industrial countries.  A second noteworthy  feature is 
the roles played by these tax rates relative to the income tax rates in Canada 
and France. While France has the highest social security and payroll tax rate 
(exceeding one-third),  Canada has the lowest rate (below  10 percent).  This 
ranking of  Canada and France is the opposite to the one obtained in figure 
6.4 pertaining to the personal income tax rate. 
In concluding this section, we present in table 6.1 selected summary data 
on the various tax rates in the major industrial countries and on their changes 
over time. The international diversity of  these rates, notably within Europe, 
is of  special interest in  view  of  the tax harmonization  plans  for Europe  of 
1992. Table 6.1  Average Tax Rates in the Major Industrial Countries (general government) 
Social Security 
Total  Consumption  Personal Income  Income  and Payroll 
Tax Rate  Tax Rate  Tax Rate  Tax Rate  Tax Rate 
1975  1980  1985  1986  1975  1980  1985  1986  1975  1980  1985  1986  1975  1980  1985  1986  1975  1980  1985  1986 
~___ 
Canada  33.8  32.8  33.6  34.0  7.4  6.8  7.7  8.5  19.6  20.1  22.0  23.2  20.9  19.9  19.7  20.6  6.0  6.2  8.3  8.6 
United  27.7  28.8  28.6  28.5  2.9  3.0  3.2  3.3  12.5  14.2  13.2  15.5  15.3  17.2  15.5  15.3  11.3  12.3  14.0  14.1 
Japan  21.5  26.0  28.3  29.2  . . .  , . .  . . .  . . .  9.4  11.6  12.8  13.2  12.0  15.0  16.7  17.2  11.3  13.9  15.7  15.7 
France  36.6  41.7  44.5  44.4  14.8  15.0  14.6  14.3  8.3  9.6  10.4  10.6  8.6  10.3  10.8  11.1  28.7  33.4  36.6  36.8 
Germany  35.7  38.0  37.9  37.5  9.2  11.1  10.5  10.3  18.9  19.8  20.2  20.0  16.3  17.7  17.6  17.2  21.5  23.0  25.7  26.1 
Italy  25.6  29.2  34.0  36.2  5.4  7.5  8.3  8.7  7.0  14.7  19.6  . . .  6.9  11.2  15.4  17.4  23.9  24.4  26.3  27.7 
United  35.4  35.3  38.1  39.0  5.1  8.6  10.0  9.7  20.1  17.0  17.4  18.9  21.1  18.4  20.2  20.3  9.5  12.3  12.3  12.4 
States 
Kingdom 
Source: Computed from OECD (1987a) and OECD (1987b). 
Note:  Our measure of the consumption-tar  rate is computed as the ratio of general taxes on goods and services (including value-added taxes, sales taxes, and other general 
taxes on goods and services) to private final consumption. For income taxes, we use various measures distinguishing between individuals and corporations as well as between 
social security and the more conventional definition of income taxes. Accordingly, the personal income  tar rate is computed as taxes on incomes, profits, and capital gains 
of individuals divided by compensation of employees (a broader internationally comparable tax base is unavailable). The income-tar  rate is computed as the taxes on income, 
profits, and capital gains (including individual and corporate taxes) divided by the compensation of employees plus property and entrepreneurial income. The social securify 
and payroll  tar rate is computed as social security contributions and payroll taxes of the work force divided by  compensation of  employees.  Finally, the total tax rate is 
computed as taxes on income, profits, and capital gains plus social security contributions plus payroll taxes plus property taxes plus taxes on goods and services, all divided 
by  GNP or GDP. To maintain a consistent use of the OECD data, we have used GNP for the United States, Japan, and Germany and GDP for Canada, France, Italy, and the 
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In the subsequent sections, we provide a sketch of  a theoretical analysis 
highlighting the key factors governing the macroeconomic effects of tax re- 
structuring that is then developed further by means of dynamic simulations. 
6.2  The Analytical Framework 
In developing the analytical framework, we start with a formulation of the 
budget  constraint  that  serves  to  focus  attention  on  the  key  economic 
variables and tax-policy parameters that play a central role in the subsequent 
analy~is.~  The home country's private-sector (full-income) budget constraint 
applicable to period (t = 0, 1, . . . ,  T - 1) is 
(1)  (1 +Tx,  + (1 -  Ty,)w,(l - e,) = (1 -  Ty,)[wI + Tkt(Kt - I 
where T,,,  T,,,,  and T~~ denote the cash flow tax rates on consumption (VAT), 
income, and international borrowing, respectively. The levels of  consump- 
tion,  labor  supply,  capital  stock,  investment,  and  the  private-sector 
international borrowing are  denoted,  respectively, by  C,,  e,, K,, I,, and 
BP. The wage rate, the capital-rental rate, and the interest rate are denoted, 
respectively,  by  w,, r,,,  and  T,.  For  convenience,  we  normalize  the 
endowment of  leisure to  unity  and  assume costs of  adjustment in  capital 
formation of the form (M)bZ:IK,.  We  note that in the final period (period 7') 
the private sector settles its debt commitments and no new investment or new 
borrowhg occurs. Accordingly, I,  = BF = 0." 
To  simplify the exposition, we assume a linear production function with 
fixed coefficients. Thus, the competitive equilibrium conditions imply that 
the wage rate and the capital-rental rates, w and r,, are constant. To simplify 
further, we  also assume that the historical debt commitment of  the private 
sector, B_Pl,  is zero. 
The formulation of  the periodic budget constraint illustrates the equiva- 
lence  relation  existing  among  the  taxes  on  consumption,  income,  and 
international borrowing. Indeed, the real effects of any given combination of 
the three taxes can be duplicated by a policy consisting of any two of them.' 
For  example, consider an initial situation with  a positive consumption tax 
rate,  7,  and  zero  income  and  international  borrowing  tax  rates.  If  the 
consumption tax was eliminated and the income and international borrowing 
taxes  were  both  set  equal  to  ?,/(I  + T,),  then  the  effective  tax  rates 
associated  with  this  new  combination  of  taxes  are  zero  income  and 
international borrowing taxes and a positive (T,)  consumption tax. It follows 
that  the  real  equilibrium  associated  with  the  new  tax  pattern  (7, = 0, 
T~ = Tb = ?,/  [I  + TJ) is identical to the one associated with the initial tax 
pattern (7, = T,,  T~~ = 76 = 0). 218  J. A. FrenkeUA. RazidS. Symansky 
The periodic (full-income) budget constraints specified in equation (1) can 
be  consolidated to  yield  the  lifetime  present-value budget  constraint.  TO 
facilitate the diagrammatic analysis of  subsequent sections, we illustrate the 
lifetime present-value budget  constraint for  a  two-period case  (t = 0,  I). 
Accordingly, 
= (%)  + (x)  -  Tyl  a, w+ (-) 
where 
As  indicated,  the  discount  factors  a,, aL,  and  aI  are  the  effective 
(tax-adjusted) discount  factors  governing  intertemporal  consumption,  lei- 
sure,  and  investment  decisions,  respectively.6 The  intratemporal  choice 
between  labor  supply  (leisure)  and  consumption  of  ordinary  goods  is 
governed by  the prevailing effective intratemporal tax ratio (1 - ~~)/(l  + 
T~).  We  note that in this cash flow formulation the effective discount factor 
governing intertemporal consumption decisions, ac,  is independent of  the 
income tax whereas the effective discount factors governing investment and 
leisure decisions,  aI  and aL,  are independent of  the  consumption tax.  In 
addition,  the  effective  discount  factors  depend  on  the  time  path  of  the 
various taxes rather than on their levels. Specifically, if the various tax rates 
do not  vary  over time,  then their time paths are  “flat,”  and the effective 
discount factors ac,  aL,  and aI  are equal to the undistorted tax-free factor, a 
=  1/(1  + ro). In  that  case,  the  intertemporal allocations are undistorted 
while the intratemporal allocations are distorted if the intratemporal tax ratio 
differs from unity. 
Having discussed the formulation of  the private-sector budget constraint, 
we  turn  next  to  the  specification of  the  multiperiod utility  function.  To 
facilitate the discussion of  the simulations reported in subsequent sections, 
we  need  to  specify  its  form  in  some  detail.  We  thus  suppose  that  the 219  International Spillovers of  Taxation 
homothetic  intraperiod  utility  function  between  consumption  of  ordinary 
goods and leisure is 
(3) 
while the interperiod utility function is 
ur = [PC,?  + (1 -  P)(1 -  C,)F]k 
t=o 
(4) 
where u  is the temporal elasticity of  substitution between leisure and con- 
sumption of ordinary goods, p is the distributive parameter of consumption, 
and 6 is the subjective discount factor. 
Maximizing the utility  functions in equations (3) and  (4)  subject to the 
lifetime present-value budget constraint (the multiperiod analogue to eq. [2]) 
yields the utility-based real spending, u, its associated price index, P, and the 
periodic demand functions for 
leisure,  1  -  C, as follows: 
(5)  u, = 
the consumption of  ordinary goods,  C, and 
where at  is period-t present-value factor (i.e., 
a, = [(l + ro)(l + rl).  . ,(1 + rt-  1)l-I. 
(8)  1  -  C,  = 
where t = 1, 1, . . . ,  T, and where wealth is 
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To  complete the description of  the private-sector behavior, we maximize 
the  representative individual wealth,  Wo,  with  respect to  investment,  Z,.' 
This yields 
T 
+ (rk + U)a.T = 0. 
Equation (9) represents the implicit investment rule.  The negative term is 
equal to the marginal cost of investment in period t, while the positive terms 
are equal to the marginal benefits consisting of  the rise in output resulting 
from the increased capital stock (the terms with r,  and a) and the fall in the 
future cost of investment (the terms associated with  [b/2]  [Z/KJz); all terms 
are expressed as present values adjusted for taxes. For the two-period case, 
the investment function implied by equation (9) is 
Equation (9a) together with  the assumption that  (a + rk) exceeds unity 
(an assumption necessary for a positive level of investment in the two-period 
case) implies that the level of  investment rises with the initial capital stock, 
KO,  with the effective (tax-adjusted) discount factor, aI,  with the rental rate, 
rk, and  with  the  consumption-coefficient, a, attached  to  the  final-period 
capital.  On  the  other  hand,  investment  falls  with  an  increase  in  the 
cost-of-adjustment parameter, b. 
This completes the presentation of the key building blocks of the model. 
In the subsequent sections, we use the model for the analysis of three issues 
in tax restructuring: revenue-neutral tax conversions, budgetary imbalances 
arising  from  changes  in  the  time  profile  of  taxes,  and  international tax 
harmonization. 
6.3  Revenue-Neutral Tax Conversions 
In  examining  the  effects  of  tax  conversions  between  income  and 
consumption tax systems, we focus on revenue-neutral reforms. By ensuring 
that  the  restructuring  of  the  tax  system  does  not  result  in  budgetary 
imbalances (which are considered separately in sec. 6.4),  we obtain the pure 
effects  of  tax  conversions.  The  present  section  is  divided  into  four 
subsections. The first lays the groundwork by considering tax conversions in 
a  small open economy, the second extends the  analytical framework to  a 
two-country  model  of  the  world  economy,  the  third  examines  tax 
conversions in  this  extended framework,  and  the fourth  reports  on  some 
dynamic simulations. 221  International Spillovers of  Taxation 
6.3.1  Tax  Conversions in a Small Open Economy 
In considering revenue-neutral tax reforms, we note that such reforms are 
characterized by  a change in the composition of  a given tax revenue among 
different tax bases. It is obtained through alterations in the various tax rates 
designed to keep total tax revenue in each period intact. In what follows, we 
focus on a reform that substitutes a consumption tax  (VAT) system for an 
income tax system.' 
Even though the focus is on consumption and income tax  systems, the 
equivalence  relation  that  exists  among  the  consumption,  income,  and 
international  borrowing  taxes  permits  us  to  simplify  the  exposition. 
Accordingly, we set the explicit consumption tax rate, T,,  equal to zero while 
maintaining the rates of the other taxes,  and 5,  different from zero so as 
to  assure  a  constant  tax  revenue.  To  simplify  further,  we  consider  the 
two-period case with inelastic labor supply'  and an international borrowing 
tax equal to a fixed proportion, 8, of the income tax. Accordingly, 
(10)  T~~=o,  Tbt=eTy,,  0~8~1,  t=0,1. 
Substituting (10) into the expressions for the effective discount factors (in 
eq. [2])  yields 
In the extreme case for which the proportionality factor, 8, is equal to zero, 
equation (1  1) implies that the effective-discount  factor applicable to consump- 
tion decisions, a,,  equals the undistorted tax-free discount factor a.  In that 
case, the tax system amounts to a pure income-tax system. In the other extreme 
case for which the proportionality factor, 8, is equal to unity, equation (1 1) 
implies that the effective discount factor applicable to investment decisions, 
aI,  is equal to the tax-free discount factor a.  In that case, the tax system 
amounts to a pure consumption tax system. 
In  figure  6.6, we  analyze  the  effects  of  revenue-neutral  conversions 
involving consumption and income tax systems."  In the figure, we portray 
combinations  of  the  intertemporal  income  tax  rates,  T,,~/T~~,  and  the 
intratemporal (constant) proportionality factor, 8 = Tb/Ty, which  generate 
constant tax revenue. The resulting iso-tax-revenue schedule is denoted by 
RR. The slope of  the schedule depends on the initial-period trade-balance 
position. For the case drawn, the trade-balance position is in surplus, and the 
schedule is negatively sloped. 
To  verify that with a trade-balance surplus the iso-tax-revenue schedule is 
downward sloping, consider a change from a consumption tax  system, in 
which  8 = 1  (e.g., point  B), to  an income-tax system, in  which  8 = 0 
(e.g.,  point  A).  This  change  can  be  thought  of  as  consisting of  two 
components.  First,  it  involves  a  permanent  reduction  of  the  prevailing 
(consumption) tax  and  a permanent equiproportional rise of  the other tax 222  J. A.  FrenkeVA. RazidS. Symansky 
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(income  tax).  Second,  it  involves  further  adjustments  in  the  newly 
introduced  tax  aimed at restoring  the  initial  level  of  tax  revenue.  If  the 
economy runs  a current-period  trade-balance  surplus so that  in the  current 
period  income  minus  investment  (the  income  tax  base)  exceeds  con- 
sumption  (the  consumption  tax  base)  while  in  the  future,  owing  to  the 
intertemporal  budget  constraint,  this  pattern  is  reversed,  the  first  com- 
ponent  of  the reform results  in a budget  surplus in the current  period  and 
in a budget deficit  in  the future.  Evidently,  the second  component of  the 
reform aimed at restoring  the initial level of tax revenue lowers the income 
tax rate in the current  period  and raises the income tax  rate  in the future. 
As  a  result,  the  intertemporal income  tax  ratio,  rises.  It  follows 
that the fall in the proportionality  factor,  0, from one to zero, holding  tax 
revenue  intact,  must  be  associated  with  a  rise  in  the  ratio  T~~/T~~. 223  International Spillovers of Taxation 
In figure 6.6, this is reflected by the negative slope of the iso-tax-revenue 
schedule  connecting  points  A  and  B. If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  initial 
period  trade-balance position  is in  deficit,  the  iso-tax-revenue  schedule is 
positively sloped. 
The I1 schedule in figure 6.6 portrays combinations of the intertemporal 
ratio,  T~~/T@,  and  the  proportionality  factor,  8,  along  which  the  level  of 
investment remains intact. As is evident from the definition of the effective 
discount factor aI  in equation (ll), a rise  in the proportionality factor,  8, 
raises  the  effective discount  factor,  a,,  and  encourages  investment if  the 
intertemporal income tax ratio, T~~/T~,  exceeds unity. In that case, in order 
to maintain the initial level of investment intact, the rise in 8 (which raises 
aI)  must be  accompanied by  a  rise  in  the  intertemporal  income tax  ratio 
(which  lowers  aI).  This  is  the  case  shown  by  the  positively  sloped  I1 
schedule in figure 6.6. 
The CC schedule in figure 6.6 portrays combinations of T~~/T~  and 8 that 
maintain a given growth rate of consumption (indicated by the intertemporal 
consumption ratio C,/C,).  Applying a similar reasoning to the analysis of the 
effects  of  changes in  8 and  T~~/T~~  on the  effective discount factor  a, in 
equation (1  l),  it can be verified that the iso-consumption-growth  schedule, 
CC, is negatively sloped if the intertemporal income tax ratio exceeds unity. 
The slopes of the I1 and the CC schedules are reversed if  the intertemporal 
income tax ratio falls short of unity. In the borderline case in which the path 
of  the  income  tax  rates  is  flat  (so that  T~~/T~  = l), the  two  schedules 
coincide with the horizontal line DE. 
These  ingredients  can  now  be  used  to  analyze  the  consequences  of  a 
revenue-neutral  tax  conversion.  As  should  be  evident  from  the  foregoing 
discussion, the key factor governing the effects of  such tax policies is the 
initial trade-balance position. In terms of figure 6.6, if  the economy runs a 
current-period  trade-balance  surplus and the intertemporal income tax ratio 
exceeds unity, then a revenue-neutral tax reform that replaces a consumption 
tax  system (indicated  by point B) by  an income tax  system (indicated  by 
point  A)  moves  the  economy to new  iso-investment  and  iso-consumption 
growth schedules passing through point A (not drawn). These new schedules 
correspond to lower investment  and growth rate of  consumption. A similar 
argument  shows  that,  if  the  economy  runs  a  current-period  trade-balance 
deficit, the same tax conversion reduces the level of investment and lowers 
the growth rate of consumption.” 
If the tax conversion is in the opposite direction so that an income tax system 
is replaced by a consumption tax system and the economy runs a trade-balance 
surplus, then such a conversion shifts the equilibrium from point A to point B in 
figure 6.6. The iso-investment and iso-consumption growth schedules passing 
through point B (not drawn) indicate that the new equilibrium is associated with 
a higher level of investment and growth rate of consumption. The opposite results 
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6.3.2  The World Economy 
We now extend the analysis to a two-country model of the world economy 
consisting of the domestic and the foreign countries. The economic structure 
of the foreign economy is similar to that of the domestic economy described 
in section 6.3.1. The endowments and the parameters of  the production and 
utility functions,  however, may differ across countries.  Variables pertaining 
to  the  foreign  country  are  denoted  by  asterisks.  In  contrast  with  the 
small-country case, the world rate of interest is endogenously determined in 
the two-country  model. To  facilitate the exposition,  we assume that initially 
all taxes  are  zero.  Thus, in  terms  of  equation  (2),  the  domestic  discount 
factors  governing  consumption  and  investment  decisions,  a, and  a,, 
respectively, are initially equal to the world discount factor a = 1/(  1 + ro). 
In  what  follows,  we  carry  out  the  analysis  by  means  of  a  simple 
diagrammatic apparatus. l3 The initial equilibrium is portrayed in figure 6.7, 
in which the upward-sloping schedule, S",  describes the ratio, z, of current 
to  future  world  GDP net  of  investment  (denoted  by  z) as  an  increasing 
function  of  the  rate  of  interest.  Accordingly,  the  world  relative  supply 
(evaluated at r  = ro) is 
zw  = 
Yl  + u; 
(12) 
where Y denotes output. 
t 
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The positive dependence of z on the rate of interest reflects the fact that a 
rise  in  the  rate  of  interest lowers  investment. The world  relative supply 
schedule, S",  is a weighted average of  the domestic country relative supply 
schedule, S, where 
and the foreign country relative supply schedule, S*, where 
Accordingly, 
where the domestic-country weight is 
The downward-sloping schedules in  figure 6.7 plot the desired ratio of 
current to future consumption as a decreasing function of the rate of interest. 
The  domestic  and  foreign relative demands are  denoted  by  D  and  D*, 
respectively, and their values at the point in which CdC, = CG/C; = 1 are 
one plus the subjective rate of time preference, 1/S and  US*. 
Analogously to the construction of  the world relative supply, the world 
relative demand, D"  = C,W/Cp = (C, + CG) / (C, +  Cy),  is a weighted 
average  of  the  two  countries'  relative  demands,  D = Co/C,  and 
D*  = C;/C;. Accordingly, 
(151  DW  = FdD  + (1 - pd)D*, 
where the domestic-country weight is 
C1 
pd = c,  + c;' 
The initial equilibrium is exhibited by  point A in figure 6.7. As shown, the 
world rate of  interest is ro, and the world consumption ratio (indicating the 
reciprocal of  the growth rate of world consumption) is C,W/G.  The domestic 
and foreign consumption ratios corresponding to this equilibrium are C&, 
and CG/C;, as indicated by  points B and C, respectively. We  also note that 
the domestic and  foreign relative supplies associated with this equilibrium 
are z  and z*,  as indicated by  points D and E, respectively. As is evident, 
these levels of relative supplies are associated with the equilibrium levels of 
domestic and foreign investment. Finally, since point B lies to the right of 
point D while point C lies to the left of  point E, the domestic economy runs 
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corresponding  trade-balance  surplus.  This  pattern  of  trade  imbalances  is 
implied from the assumed zero level of the predetermined initial debt position. 
Obviously,  solvency  implies  that this  configuration  of  trade  imbalances is 
reversed  in the  subsequent  period.  We  also note  that  this pattern  of  trade 
imbalances implies that the equilibrium domestic relative demand weight, pd, 
falls short of the corresponding relative supply weight, ks.I4 
6.3.3 
Consider a revenue-neutral  tax reform that introduces a consumption tax 
system in place of an income tax system. As before, the tax reform can be 
divided  into  two  components.  We  first  introduce  permanent  consumption 
taxes at the rate T,  accompanied by the equiproportional reduction in income 
taxes.I5 As is evident from our previous discussions, this tax shift creates a 
current-period  government  budget  surplus if  the domestic economy runs  a 
current-period trade-balance deficit,  and vice versa. Obviously, this pattern 
of budgetary and trade imbalances is reversed in the subsequent period. The 
second component of  the tax reform aims at restoring revenue neutrality in 
each period. Since the economy has adopted a consumption tax system, it is 
assumed  that  the  restoration  of  revenue  neutrality  is  achieved  through 
appropriate further adjustments in the consumption tax rates. 
Suppose that  the domestic economy runs  an initial-period  trade-balance 
deficit.  Under  such  circumstances,  the  first component  of  the  tax  reform 
results in an initial-period government budget surplus and in a corresponding 
future-period  deficit.  To restore  revenue neutrality,  the current-period  con- 
sumption tax rate, T&,  must be lowered while the corresponding future-period 
rate, T,~,  must be raised. This pattern of tax rates breaks the initial flatness of 
the time profile of the consumption tax so that T&  <  T,~.  The new configuration 
of the consumption tax rates raises a,-the  effective discount factor applicable 
to consumption decisions-so  that a, = [(  1 + T,.)/( 1 + ~,~)]a  exceeds the 
world discount factor a = 1/(1 + ro). Since income taxes remain flat, the 
effective discount factor applicable to investment decisions remains intact, so 
that aI  = a. 
Armed with this information, we analyze in figure 6.8 the effects of this 
tax  reform.  The initial  equilibrium is portrayed  by  point  A  at  which  the 
world rate of  interest is r, (as in fig. 6.7). The rise in the effective discount 
factor  applicable  to consumption (i.e., the reduction  in the corresponding 
effective rate of  interest) induces an intertemporal substitution  in domestic 
demand toward current-period consumption. Thus, for each and every value 
of  the world rate of interest, the domestic (relative) demand schedule shifts 
to  the  right  from D  to  D'.  The proportional  vertical  displacement of  the 
schedule equals the proportional tax-induced  rise in the effective discount 
factor.  This  proportion  is  (1 + ~,~)/(l  + T,,,).  Associated  with  the  new 
levels  of  domestic  demand,  the  new  world  relative  demand  (C, + CG)/ 
(C, + Cy) also shifts to the right from D"  to D"'  in figure 6.8. This shift 
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Fig. 6.8  The effects of  a revenue-neutral tax shift from income taxes to 
consumption taxes with an initial-period domestic trade-balance deficit 
reflects  the  substitution from future  to  current-period consumption in  the 
domestic  economy.  l6  Furthermore,  the  proportional  displacement  of  the 
world relative demand schedule is smaller than the corresponding displace- 
ment of  the domestic relative demand schedule.  l7 
In  contrast with  the  effects of  the  tax  reforms  on  the relative demand 
schedules, this reform does not affect the effective discount factor applicable 
to  investment decisions,  and  it  leaves the  world  relative  supply schedule 
intact. The new  equilibrium obtains at the intersection of  the (unchanged) 
world  relative  supply  schedule,  S",  and  the  new  world  relative  demand 
schedule, D"'.  This equilibrium is indicated by  point A'  in figure 6.8, at 
which the world rate of  interest has risen from r, to rb. 
To determine the incidence of this change on the domestic effective rate of 
interest,  we  subtract  from  1 + r,  the  distance  BC,  representing  the 
tax-induced percentage change in the effective discount factor. This yields 
1 + FA  in figure 6.8. As is evident, FA  is lower than the initial world rate r, 
since  the  vertical  displacement  of  the  D"  schedule  is  smaller  than  the 
magnitude represented by the distance BC. 
In view of the rise in the world rate of interest, both domestic and foreign 
investment fall, and the rate of growth of foreign consumption, as indicated 
by the move from point E to point E' in figure 6.8, rises. On the other hand, 
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lowers the rate of growth of domestic consumption, as indicated by the move 
from point F to point C.  Thus, this tax reform crowds out both domestic and 
foreign investment and results in  a negative correlation between the rates of 
growth of domestic and foreign consumption. Using similar reasoning, we can 
show that, in the presence of an initial surplus in the balance of trade, the tax 
reform crowds in both domestic and foreign investment, lowers the rate of 
growth of foreign consumption, and raises the growth rate of domestic con- 
sumption. As in the small-country case (discussed in sec. 6.3. l),  this analysis 
also underscores the critical importance of  the trade-balance position in  de- 
termining the domestic and international effects of such a tax reform. 
The same reasoning can be used to analyze the opposite tax conversion, 
from  a consumption tax  to  an  income tax  system.  In  that  case,  the  first 
component  of  the  tax  restructuring  yields  a  budgetary  deficit  if  the 
initial-period current-account position was in deficit (so that income net  of 
investment falls short of consumption). The restoration of revenue neutrality 
therefore  involves a rise  in  the  initial-period income tax  rate,  T*,  and  a 
corresponding reduction  in  the  future-period income  tax  rate,  T~~.  These 
changes in the time profile of income taxes raise the effective discount factor 
governing  investment  decisions,  q,  while  keeping  intact  the  effective 
discount factor governing consumption decisions,  ac.  In  terms  of  figures 
6.7-6.8,  the rise in investment induces a leftward shift of the relative supply 
schedule, resulting in a higher world rate of  interest. The rise in the world 
rate of interest crowds out foreign investment, while the fall in the domestic 
effective rate of  interest applicable to domestic investment decisions crowds 
in domestic investment. This tax conversion also raises the rates of growth of 
domestic and foreign consumption. As is evident, in contrast with the case 
shown in figure 6.8 in which the tax conversion from income to consumption 
tax system alters the relative demand schedules, in the present case, where 
the conversion is from a consumption to an income tax system, the reform 
alters  the  world  equilibrium  through  its  effect  on  the  relative  supply 
schedules.  Obviously,  these  results  reflect  the  assumed  initial-period 
trade-balance deficit.  They  are reversed  if  the  initial-period trade-balance 
position is in  surplus. 
6.3.4  Dynamic Simulations of Tax Conversions 
The foregoing analysis identified the key factors determining the domestic 
and international consequences of  revenue-neutral tax reforms. We  turn next 
to  highlight  these  features  by  means  of  dynamic  simulations.  For  that 
purpose, we return to the multiperiod model and allow for a variable labor 
supply.  The  detailed  specification of  the  two-country  dynamic-simulation 
model is provided in the appendix. 
In performing the simulations, we  first computed a baseline equilibrium. 
This equilibrium was then  perturbed by  the assumed tax  conversion. The 
various figures presented  below  show the  effects of  the  tax  restructuring 
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As indicated by the theoretical analysis, a key factor governing the effects 
of  such  revenue-neutral  tax  conversions  is  the  time  pattern  of  the 
trade-balance position. Since the trade-balance position can be expressed in 
terms  of  the  saving-investment gap,  trade  imbalances reflect  intercountry 
differences  in  either  saving  propensities  (induced,  e .g .  , by  differences 
between  the  subjective discount factors,  6 and  6*) or investment patterns 
(induced, e.g.,  by  differences between the productivities of  capital, r, and 
ri).  In  figures  6.9-6.12,  we  plot  the  simulation  results  for  cases 
distinguished according to the time pattern of trade imbalances. We  focus in 
these simulations on tax conversions from an income to a consumption tax 
system. Throughout, we  assume that the home country reduces permanently 
its  income tax  rates by  5 percent  and  restores its  tax  revenue by  raising 
consumption tax rates. 
Consider first figures 6.9 and 6.10. These figures characterize the situation 
in which in the early periods the home country runs trade-balance deficits. 
Obviously, the intertemporal budget constraints imply that  in later periods 
the country runs trade-balance surpluses. The initial domestic trade deficits 
may arise from either a relatively low saving propensity (6 < a*),  shown in 
figure 6.9, or from a relatively high productivity of capital (rk  > ri),  shown 
in  figure  6.10.  These  figures  demonstrate  the  results  obtained  in  the 
simplified  theoretical  analysis  as  well  as  new  results  reflecting  the 
multiperiod-variable labor supply model.  As seen,  the revenue-neutral tax 
conversion policy from income to consumption taxes raises the world rates 
of  interest, lowers domestic and foreign investment, and worsens the home 
country’s (early-periods) current account of the balance payments. Reflecting 
the solvency requirement, the simulations show that,  in the medium term, 
the home country’s current account improves. Throughout the  adjustment 
process, the home country external-debt position worsens. The changes in 
the domestic tax structure induce corresponding changes in labor supply and 
output. As seen, both domestic employment and output decline in the early 
periods  following the  tax  conversion.  In  the  medium  term,  the  level  of 
domestic employment rises. The medium-term effects of the tax conversion on 
the level of domestic output reflect the rise in employment and the decline in the 
capital stock. Figure 6.9 shows a case in which output rises in the medium term, 
while figure 6.10 shows the opposite case. These results, which correspond to the 
case in which the home country runs trade-balance deficits in the early period, are 
reversed in the opposite case, in which the country runs early-periods trade 
surpluses. Such  an  opposite pattern  is exhibited in  figures  6.11 and  6.12, 
corresponding, respectively, to the cases in which the home country has a high 
saving propensity (8 > 6*) and low investment (rk  < rz). 
6.4  Budget Deficits under Consumption and Income Tax Systems 
The  analysis  in  section  6.3 focused  on  the  effects  of  changes  in  the 
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tax  revenue.  Such  revenue-neutral  tax  restructuring  ensures  that  the  tax 
conversion policies do not affect the budgetary  imbalances.  In this section, 
we  use the  same analytical  framework  to shed  light on the  domestic  and 
international macroeconomic consequences of changes in the timing of taxes 
and provide dynamic simulations. l8 
6.4.1  Budget Deficits in a Two-Country World Economy 
Consider the effects of budget deficits arising from a current tax cut. Of 
course, the intertemporal government budget constraint implies that, as long 
as government spending remains intact, the current tax cut must be followed 
by  a  future rise  in  taxes.  The main  conclusion  of  the  analysis  is that  the 
effect of budget deficits depends critically on whether it arises from changes 
in the timing of consumption or income taxes. 
Consider first a budget deficit arising from a current-period  consumption 
tax cut (followed by a corresponding rise in future consumption taxes). As is 
evident from the definitions of the effective discount factors in equation (2), 
such a tax  shift raises the effective  discount factor governing consumption 
decisions,  ac,  while  leaving  the  discount  factor  governing  investment 
decisions intact. These changes induce a substitution of demand from future 
to current consumption and induce rightward shifts of the domestic (and the 
world)  relative  demand  schedules  in  figure  6.7 while  leaving  the  relative 
supply schedules intact.  l9 
Figure  6.8,  which  was  used  for  the  analysis  of  tax  conversion  from 
income to consumption tax systems, is also fully applicable for the analysis 
of  the  budget  deficit  under  the  consumption  tax  system.  Accordingly,  the 
budget deficit raises the world rate of  interest and crowds out domestic and 
foreign investment. It also lowers the growth rate of domestic consumption 
while raising the growth rate of foreign consumption. 
By  the  same reasoning,  a  budget  deficit  arising  from a  cut  in  current 
income tax rates (and followed by a corresponding rise in future income tax 
rates)  yields  results  similar  to  those  obtained  under  a revenue-neutral  tax 
conversion  from consumption  to income tax  systems.  Again,  as is evident 
from  the  definitions  of  the  effective  discount  factors  in  equation  (2),  this 
change in the timing of income tax rates lowers the effective discount factor 
governing  investment  decisions,  aI,  and discourages  domestic  investment 
while leaving a, intact.  In terms of figure 6.7, these tax changes induce a 
rightward  shift  of  the  domestic  (and  the  world)  relative  supply  schedule 
while  leaving the relative  demand  schedules  intact.  As a result,  the  world 
rate of interest falls, foreign investment rises, and the domestic investment is 
crowded out. At the same time, the lower world rate of interest lowers the 
growth rate of both domestic and foreign consumption. 
6.4.2  Dynamic Simulations of Budget Deficits 
The simulations that allow for a variable labor supply in a multiperiod model 
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the critical importance of the underlying tax system in determining the mac- 
roeconomic effects of budget deficits. They also provide further insights into 
the dynamic consequences of budget deficits. 
Figures 6.13 and 6.14 contain selected simulations of the dynamic effects 
of current-period budget deficits under a consumption tax system and under 
an income tax system, respectively. We  assume that the current-period deficit 
arises from a  10 percent reduction in tax rates, which is made up for by  a 
permanent rise in tax rates in all future periods. By and large, the directions 
of  changes in the various variables in the two figures are opposite to each 
other.  This underscores the key  proposition of  the theoretical analysis. In 
addition, the simulations show that the effects of  the budget deficit on the 
qualitative characteristics of  the time path of  employment and output also 
depend  critically  on  the  underlying  tax  system.  Specifically,  under  a 
consumption  tax  system,  a  domestic  budget  deficit  exerts  recessionary 
effects on the contemporaneous levels of  domestic employment and output 
and  expansionary  effects  on  the  corresponding  levels  abroad.  These 
employment  and  output  effects  are  reversed  in  all  future  periods.”  In 
contrast,  under  an  income tax  system,  the  same budget  deficit induces a 
contemporaneous expansion at home and a recession abroad. These changes 
are reversed in subsequent periods. In general, the international transmission 
of the effects of budget deficits is shown to be negative in both the short and 
the medium run. 
We  also note that the current-period budget deficit exerts opposite effects 
on the levels of domestic and foreign consumption. Under a consumption tax 
system, the deficit raises current-period domestic consumption and lowers 
the corresponding level of foreign consumption. These changes are reversed 
in  subsequent periods.  In contrast,  under an income tax  system, domestic 
consumption falls in the current period while foreign consumption rises, and, 
as before, these changes are reversed in subsequent periods. Again, in terms of 
the correlations between domestic and  foreign consumption, the  simulations 
demonstrate the negative transmission of the effects of domestic budget deficits. 
The effects of  the budget deficits on the time paths of  consumption and 
leisure influence the levels of domestic and foreign welfare. Using the utility 
function specified  in  equation  (4), our  simulations show  that  the  current 
period budget deficit, arising from a 10 percent reduction in the consumption 
tax rate, raises the level of domestic welfare (by about 2 percent) and lowers 
the  level  of  foreign  welfare  (by  about  1.5 percent).  In  contrast,  if  the 
current-period  budget  deficit  arises  from  a  10  percent  reduction  in  the 
income tax rate, then the level of domestic welfare falls (by about 3 percent) 
while the corresponding foreign welfare rises (by about 3.5 percent). These 
opposite changes in the  levels of  domestic and foreign welfare reflect the 
negative transmission of the effects of budget deficits. 
The  effects  of  an  expected  future-period budget  deficit  are  shown  in 
figures 6.15-6.16.  These simulations show the consequences of an expected 
10 percent tax cut in periods 4 and 5 that is then made up for by  a permanent -  6  2  5.0~  ---__  ----_ 
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Fig. 6.14  Budget deficit under an income tax system: 10% decrease in income tax in year 0  .. 
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rise in tax rates in all subsequent periods.  As before, they reveal the central 
role  played  by  the  tax  system. They  also  reveal  the  general  feature  of  a 
negative transmission.  However, since the various changes in tax rates occur 
only in the more distant future, our simulations show that their effects on the 
levels  of  domestic  and  foreign  utility  (viewed  from the  standpoint  of  the 
current period) are very small. 
6.5  VAT  Harmonization 
In  this  section, we  examine the  dynamic  effects  of  international  VAT 
harmonization.  Such  policies  form  an  important  ingredient  of  the  wide- 
ranging  measures  associated  with  the  move  toward  the  single  market  of 
Europe of  1992. In the fiscal area, the European Commission has drawn up 
various proposals on the approximation of the rates and the harmonization of 
the structures of VAT. 
The process  of  harmonization  of  the  VAT  systems  has  started  with  the 
First Council Directive of April  1967 and has proceeded thereafter through 
consecutive directives. The process involved the adoption of VAT  in various 
member  countries  and  the  continuous  convergence  of  rates  and  structures 
among members of the community. Much of the discussion surrounding the 
practical  implementation  of  the approximation  of  the  VAT  rates  concerned 
the  width  of  bands  within  which  various  VAT  rates  should be  placed, the 
products to which  a reduced rate  would be applicable,  and the problem of 
zero-rated  products.*’  For  1992, the commission envisaged a standard VAT 
rate  ranging  between  14 and  20  percent  and  a  reduced  rate  (applied  to 
selected categories,  such  as foodstuffs)  ranging  between  4  and  9 percent. 
The commission proposes to abolish the higher  rate that presently  exists in 
some  member  countries  on  certain  categories  of  goods.  In  subsequent 
discussions,  an alternative proposal was considered,  according to which the 
standard rate band would be replaced by a minimum rate applicable from  1 
January  1993. Each member state would choose a rate at least equal to the 
minimum  rate,  with  due regard  to  the  budgetary  implications  and  to  the 
“competitive  pressures”  arising from the rates chosen by other neighboring 
states and main trading partners. Table 6.2 provides summary information on 
VAT  in  the  European  Community.  It  illustrates  the  disparities  among  the 
various member-country VAT  rates. 
One of  the  central  issues  that  needs  to be  addressed  is  the  budgetary 
consequences  of  the  harmonization  in  the  VAT  systems.  A  few  member 
states (notably Denmark and Ireland) would suffer considerable tax revenue 
losses,  while others (notably Spain, Luxembourg,  and Portugal)  would  see 
their tax revenue go up considerably. 
In what follows, we present dynamic simulations of  the consequences of 
international  harmonization  of  VAT.  We  use  our  two-country  model  and 
presume  that,  prior to the VAT  harmonization,  the  two countries  use very 
different  tax  systems.  The  home  country  tax  revenue  stems  from  high 237  International Spillovers of  Taxation 
Table 6.2  VAT  Rates in the European Community (1989) 
Statutory Rates (%) 
Revenue 
Contribution  Revenue 
as % of  Contribution 
Total Tax  as % of 
Country (year of  VAT  Reduced  Standard  Higher  Revenue  GDP 












United Kingdom (1973) 
Commission proposal: 
1,  6, 7 
0 
5.5,  7 
7 
3,  6 
0,  2.2,  10 








19  25, 33  15.5 
22  ...  19.5 
18.6  28  19.2 
14  ...  15.3 
18  36  ... 
25  ...  20.8 
18  38  14.5 
12  ...  13.3 
19  ...  16.5 
17  30  17.6 
12  33  ... 
15  ...  15.5 
4 to 9 
4 to 9  minimum rate 














Sources; Table 2.1  in Cnossen and Shoup (1987) and table 3.5.1 in European Economy (March 
1988); EC: The Evolution  of  VAT Rates Applicable  in  the Member  States of  the  Community 
(Inter-tax,  1987/3, pp. 85-88);  and  OECD, Revenue  Statistics of  OECD Member  Countries 
(Paris,  1988). 
income tax, while  the foreign  country  revenue  stems from high  VAT.  The 
harmonization of  VAT  entails a rise  in the home country  VAT  rate  and  an 
equivalent reduction in the foreign VAT  rate. 
To avoid the budgetary imbalances consequent on the changes in the VAT 
rates, we ensure revenue neutrality by adopting the same procedure used in 
the  analysis  of  tax  conversions  in  section  6.3.  Accordingly,  the  induced 
budgetary imbalances are corrected through changes in income tax rates. In 
the  home country,  the  rise  in  the  VAT  is  accompanied  by  a  reduction  in 
income tax rates,  whereas in the foreign country the fall in the VAT  rate is 
accompanied by a corresponding rise in income tax rates. The narrowing of 
the international disparities between VAT captures the commission’s proposal 
of reducing the disparities of VAT rates among member countries and categories 
of goods. The maintenance of budgetary balance through appropriate changes 
in income tax rates makes the analysis of revenue-neutral tax conversion of 
section 6.2 applicable to the problem at hand. 
In performing the  simulations,  we first computed a baseline equilibrium. 
This equilibrium  was  then  perturbed  by  the  assumed  VAT  harmonization. 238  J. A. FrenkeUA.  RazidS. Symansky 
The various figures presented below show the effects of the tax restructuring 
measured as percentage deviations from the basehe levels. 
As indicated by the theoretical analysis, one of the key factors governing the 
effects of revenue-neutral tax conversions is the time pattern  of the current- 
account position. Since the current-account positions can be expressed in terms 
of  the saving-investment gap, they  reflect  intercountry differences either in 
saving propensities,  induced, for example, by differences between the sub- 
jective discount factors, 6 and 6*, or in  investment patterns,  induced, for 
example, by differences between the productivities  of  capital,  r, and ri. In 
figures  6.17-6.22,  we  plot  the  simulation  results  for cases  distinguished 
according to the time pattern of current-account imbalances. In these figures, 
we assume that the income tax used in both countries is of the case-flow variety. 
Throughout, we assume that the home country raises permanently its VAT by 
6 percent  and restores its tax revenue by lowering its cash-flow  income tax 
rates; the foreign country (whose initial VAT rate is assumed to be high) lowers 
permanently its VAT  by 6 percent and restores its tax revenue by raising its 
cash-flow income tax rates. The figures show the paths of domestic and foreign 
output, labor supply, savings, investment, and consumption as well as the paths 
of the world rate of interest and the home country’s external debt consequent 
on the VAT  harmonization.  All paths are expressed as percentage deviations 
from baseline (except for the rate of interest, whose deviation is expressed in 
basis points). The simulations reveal that the international VAT harmonization 
triggers  a dynamic  response  in  all the  key  macroeconomic  variables.  The 
specific nature of the dynamic response reflects international differences in the 
parameters governing saving and investment patterns. 
The  key  features  of  the  simulation  analysis  of  tax  harmonization 
underlying  figures  6.17-6.22  are  summarized  in  table  6.3,  which  also 
reports the implied welfare implications of  the VAT  harmonization.  In order 
to capture the essence of the dynamic evolution of the various variables, we 
report in table 6.3 the direction of changes for both the short run (SR) and 
the medium run (MR). In figures 6.17-6.18,  we show the time path of the 
endogenously determined home and foreign income tax rates. These rates are 
adjusted in each period so as to offset the budgetary implications of the VAT 
harmonization. The changes in the time profile of income taxes influence the 
present-value  factors  governing  intertemporal  investment  and  labor-supply 
decisions. In addition, the level changes in the VAT rates affect intratemporal 
consumption-leisure choice. In  figures 6.19-6.22,  we show the correspond- 
ing effects on employment,  investment,  consumption,  the  current account, 
and welfare. 
In conformity with the tax conversion analysis of  section 6.3, the results 
in table 6.3  demonstrate the key role played by the current-account position. 
Specifically,  if  in the  early  stage the home  country runs a current-account 
deficit owing to low saving or high investment (e.g., if  6 < 6* or r, > ri), 
then the paths of domestic and foreign income tax rates rise over time while 239  International Spillovers of  Taxation 
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the world rate of interest falls. In that case, the rates of  growth of domestic 
and foreign consumption  (8, and gz  respectively)  fall, both in the short and 
in the medium runs. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  configuration  of  saving  and  investment 
propensities is such that the home country runs a current-account  surplus in 
the early stage, then the dynamic effects of  the VAT  harmonization  on these 1 
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Table 6.3  Effects of VAT  Harmonization under Alternative Current-Account 
Positions (deviations from baseline) 
Home Country Current-Account Deficit  Home Country Current-Account Surplus 
Variable  6 < 6*, re = r;  6  =  S*,  rk > ri  6 > 6*, rk  = r;  6 = S*, rk  < r; 
SR  MR  SR  MR  SR  MR  SR  MR 
Path of T~ 
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Note; The VAT  harmonization  obtains  through  a permanent  reduction  in  T,  and  a rise  in  T:. 
Budgetary balance obtains through appropriate adjustments in the periodic income tax rates,  T~ 
and T;.  SR and MR denote, respectively, the short run and the medium run. The tax system is a 
cash-flow system. In general, the short run pertains to the first few periods,  while the medium 
run pertains to the remaining periods in the simulation. For the utility index, SR pertains to the 
discounted sum of utilities over the entire periods except for the final one, while MR pertains to 
the final-period utility (reflecting the entire function beyond the simulation period). 
variables are reversed.  Specifically, if in the home country saving is high or 
investment is low  (e.g., if  S > S* or r, < r;), then the paths of domestic 
and foreign income tax rates fall while the world rate of interest rises. In that 
case, the rates of  growth of  domestic and foreign consumption  rise.  Thus, 
under the present cash-flow  income tax system, the direction of  changes in 
the world rate of interest and in the growth rates of consumption consequent 
on international VAT  harmonization  depend exclusively on the paths of  the 
saving-investment gap. 
The lower  panel  of  table  6.3 summarizes  the  corresponding  short-  and 
medium-run changes in other key economic variables. As can be seen, in the 
cases considered,  the international VAT  harmonization crowds out domestic 
investment  and  crowds  in foreign  investment  independent  of  the  current- 
account positions. These investment responses reflect the induced changes in 
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These changes in the effective discount factors reflect two conflicting effects: 
the effect of the change in the world rate of interest and the opposite effect of 
the change in the tax wedges induced by the alteration of  the time paths of 
income tax rates. The changes in the tax structure also alter the intraperiod 
tax ratios governing labor supply and consumption demand. These tax ratios 
are subject to conflicting forces since the changes in the consumption tax 
rates and  the  associated changes in  the  income tax rates  induce opposite 
effects on both labor supply and consumption demand. In addition to these 
conventional  substitution  mechanisms,  the  simulation  results  also  reflect 
wealth effects on labor supply and consumption demand induced by changes 
in the intertemporal terms of trade (the world rate of interest) and by changes 
in the excess burden  associated with the distorted tax  system. Finally, the 
time  paths  of  labor  supply  and  consumption demand  are  altered  by  the 
intertemporal  substitution  induced  by  changes  in  the  effective  discount 
factors governing labor supply and consumption demand.  The changes in 
these discount factors arise from the change in the world rate of interest and, 
in the case of  labor supplies, from the changes in the time paths of income 
taxes.  The  welfare  effects  of  term-of-trade  changes  depend  on  the 
magnitudeof  the  change  in  the  terms  of  trade  and  on  the  gap  between 
purchases and  sales of  the good whose relative price has changed. In our 
intertemporal context,  the terms of  trade correspond to  the world rate  of 
interest,  and  the  gap  between  purchases  and  sales  corresponds  to  the 
current-account position. As illustrated by table 6.3,  in all cases the change 
in the terms  of  trade operates in  favor of  the country that  raises its VAT. 
When the country runs a current-account deficit (i.e., when it borrows in the 
world economy), its intertemporal terms of  trade improve since the rate of 
interest  falls.  Likewise,  if  the  country’s  current-account  position  is  in 
surplus,  its  intertemporal  terms  of  trade  also  improve  since  the  rate  of 
interest rises.  As  illustrated by  the  table,  this  improvement in  the  home 
country welfare induced by  the changes in the world rate of  interest can be 
mitigated  (or  even  offset)  by  the  excess-burden  effects  of  the  VAT 
harmonization. Similar considerations apply to the welfare consequences of 
the reduction in VAT  in the foreign economy. 
A comparison between the effects of the international VAT  harmonization 
on the domestic and the foreign economies reveals that in the two countries 
the level of  foreign employment, investment, output,  and some other key 
macroeconomic indicators change in  opposite directions.  In  fact,  in  most 
cases, the utility index indicates that domestic and foreign welfare move in 
opposite  directions.  These  phenomena  suggest  the  possibility  that 
international  VAT  harmonization  may  induce  international  conflicts  of 
interest. A resolution of  such conflicts may  necessitate international fiscal 
transfers from countries benefiting from the VAT  harmonization to countries 
that  lose.  The  potential difficulties arising from  international conflicts of 
interest may be augmented by  internal conflicts of  interest associated with 244  J. A. FrenkeVA. RazidS. Symansky 
redistributions  of  income  between  labor  and  capital  in  the  short  and 
medium runs. 
The foregoing analysis was confined to the case in which the income taxes 
used to restore budgetary balance following the international VAT  harmoni- 
zation  were  of  the  cash-flow  variety.  Under  such  circumstances,  in 
conformity with  the  analytical results  of  section 6.2, the  current-account 
positions played the key role in determining the direction of  changes in the 
world  rate  of  interest  and  the  growth  rates  of  domestic  and  foreign 
consumption. As  indicated by  the simulations in  figures 6.17-6.22  and in 
the summary results in the lower panel of  table 6.3, the dynamic effects of 
the  international  VAT  harmonization  on  the  paths  of  the  other  key 
macroeconomic  variables  do  not  depend  only  on  the  current-account 
positions.  In  fact,  for  the  cases  shown  in  these  simulations,  domestic 
investment, foreign employment, foreign savings (in the short run), and the 
level of the domestic country’s external debt are reduced independent of the 
current-account positions, while foreign investment and foreign savings (in 
the medium run) always rise. 
6.6  Concluding Remarks 
The  increased  integration  of  world  goods  and  capital  markets  has 
stimulated  interest  in  the  policy  implications  of  international  economic 
interdependence. In  this paper,  we  have  analyzed several aspects of  such 
interdependence, focusing on the international transmission of tax policies. 
For this purpose, we have presented an analytical framework suitable for the 
examination of  the dynamic effects of tax restructuring. In our analysis, we 
considered the international effects of  changes in the composition and the 
timing  of  taxes.  Accordingly,  we  have  analyzed  the  consequences  of 
revenue-neutral tax conversions between income and consumption taxes as 
well as budget deficits that arise under alternative tax systems. Motivated by 
the various proposals for tax harmonizations associated with the creation of a 
single  market  in  Europe  of  1992,  we  have  also  analyzed  the  effects  of 
international VAT  harmonization. Throughout, we  have complemented our 
analytical results with illustrative dynamic simulations. We  have identified 
key  factors  governing  the  international  effects  and  transmission  of  tax 
policies. These include the intercountry differences in saving and investment 
propensities. Accordingly, we  have  shown that  the  effects of  tax  policies 
depend  critically  on  whether  the  country  adopting these  policies  runs  a 
deficit or a surplus in the current account of  its balance of  payments. We 
have  also  shown  that  the  qualitative  and  quantitative  effects  of  -budget 
deficits  depend  critically  on  whether  the  deficit  arises  from  changes  in 
income taxes or in VAT.  These factors were shown to play a central role in 
determining the effects of international tax harmonization. 
Our analysis focused on  a two-country  model of  the world economy. A 
useful  extension  would  consider  a  three-country  world  and  examine  the 245  International Spillovers of  Taxation 
consequences of tax.harmonization between two of the three countries. Such 
an  extension would  facilitate an  analysis of  “trade  creation”  and  “trade 
diversion” in both goods and capital markets in Europe of  1992. 
Appendix 
The Simulation Model 
The  model  described  in  this  appendix  was  used  in  the  simulations 
discussed in the main text. We  present below the exact computer printout of 
the  model  that  is  based  on  the  theoretical  model  described  in  the  text. 
However, this model was developed to be more general in order to evaluate 
a wider range of policy questions than are discussed in this paper. 
An attempt has been made to use the same notation in the computer model 
as  in the theoretical model.  Whenever possible,  reference is  made to the 
relevant equations in the main text. There are several additional definitions 
and specifications in the simulation model, but none of these should alter the 
theoretical propositions of the paper. First, a number of definitions have been 
added to the model in order to enhance our understanding of  the model’s 
properties or to simplify the presentation of an equation (e.g., the definition 
of  income).  In  addition,  equations have been  added  in  order to  examine 
many  possible government policy  scenarios (e.g., tax reaction functions). 
Finally, some equations have been added to account for endpoint and starting 
point conditions (e.g., consumption of endpoint capital). 
A few general notational rules were followed in order to make the reading 
of the model a little easier. Also CiT,, Xi is written out as SUM [I = 1 to T: 
X(i)]. In  general,  all home  country variables end  with  an  H  and  foreign 
variables with an F. The model is simulated for years 20-40. 
Endogenous Variables 
BH  =home international borrowing (-BH for the foreign 
=  home (foreign) private-sector international borrowing. 
=  home (foreign) private consumption. 




EH(F  1 
leisure consumption). 
INVAD JH(  F ) 
INVH(  F ) 
KW)  =home (foreign) capital stock. 
=  home (foreign) net investment. 






=  home (foreign) labor supply. 
=  home (foreign) tax-adjusted price of  consumption. 
=home (foreign) price index of  utility-based real 
=  home (foreign) tax-adjusted price of labor. 
=rate of  interest plus one. 
=the inverse of  the present-value factor. 
=the inverse of  the present-value factor (tax adjusted). 
=  home (foreign) tax-adjusted present-value factor in 
=  home (foreign) cumulative government surplus. 
=home (foreign) tax rate on bonds  (T~  in the text). 
=home (foreign) consumption tax rate (7,  in the text). 
=home (foreign) capital stock consumed in period T. 
=home (foreign) income tax rate (T~  in the text). 
=  home (foreign) utility-based total expenditure. 
=home (foreign) wealth. 
=  home (foreign) income. 
=home (foreign) lifetime utility from t  = 0 to T. 
spending. 
period T. 
Exogenous Variables and Parameters 
GWF) 
INVOH(F) 
TCH(  F )BAR 
TYH(F)BAR 





MPKH(  F ) 
S  IGMAH(  F ) 
THETAH(F) 
=  home (foreign) government spending. 
=  home (foreign) investment in period 0. 
=  home (foreign) consumption tax rate when income 
=  home (foreign) income tax rate when consumption 
=home (foreign) wage rate (w  in the text). 
=  home (foreign) fraction of consumption of end 
=home (foreign) adjustment parameter of the capital 
=home (foreign) distributive parameter of 
=home (foreign) subjective discount rate  (6 in text). 
=home (foreign) marginal product of  capital (rk  in the 
=  home (foreign) consumption-leisure elasticity of 
=home (foreign) rate of depreciation of capital stock. 
tax rate is endogenous. 
tax rate is endogenous. 
period capital stock (a in the text). 
stock (b  in the text). 
consumption (p in  the text). 
text). 




=  home (foreign) tax dummy (1 [O]  income 
=  home (foreign) determines relation between bond 
=home (foreign) value of terminal budget deficit. 
[consumption] tax is endogenous). 
and income taxes (0 in the text). 
= WAGEH*LH +  (MPKH -  THETAH)*KH. 
= WAGEF*LF +  (MPKF -  THETAF)*KF. 
= (1 -  BETAH)**SIGMAH*PCH**( -  SIGMAH)*EH/ 
((  1 -  BETAH)**SIGMAH*PCH**(  1 -  SIGMAH) 
+  BETAH** SIGMAH*PLH**(l -  SIGMAH)). 
= (1 -  BETAF)**SIGMAF*PCF**( -  SIGMAF)* 
EF/(( 1 -  BETAF)**SIGMAF*PCF**(  1 -  SIGMAF) 
+ BETAF**SIGMAF*PLF**(  1 -  SIGMAF)). 
= BETAH*  *  SIGMAH  *PLH*  *  ( -  SIGMAH)  *EH/ 
((  1 -  BETAH)**SIGMAH*PCH**(  1 -  SIGMAH) 
+ BETAH**SIGMAH*PLH**(l -  SIGMAH)). 
= B  ETAF* *  SIGM  AF*  PLF*  *  ( -  SIGM  AF )  *  EF/ 
((  1 -  BETAF)**SIGMAF*PCF**(l -  SIGMAF) 
+  BETAF **SIGMAF*PLF**(l -  SIGMAF)). 
= ((1 - BETAH)**SIGMAH*PCH** 
(1 -  SIGMAH) +  BETAH**SIGMAH*PLH** 
(1 -  SIGMAH))**( 1/(  1 -  SIGMAH)). 
= ((1 -  BETAF)**SIGMAF*PCF**(  1 -  SIGMAF) 
+  BETAF**SIGMAF*PLF**(l -  SIGMAF))** 
(1/(  1 -  SIGMAF)). 
= IF YEAR() EQ 20 THEN INVADJH -  INVOH ELSE 
( -  (1 -  TYH( -  l)))/(RRH( -  1))" 
(1 +  KADJH*INVADJH/KH( -  1)) +  (1 -  THETAH)** 
(20 -  TIME) *(MPKH -  THETAH +  ALPHAH)/R20 
+SUM(I  = 1 TO 19 : (1 -THETAH)**(I-  1)* 
(1 -  TYH(1-  l))/RRH(I -  1)* IDUM(I)* 
(MPKH -  THETAH) +  (1 -  TYH(1-  l))*KADJW2* 
(INVADJH(I)/KH(I-  1))**2). 
= IF YEAR() EQ 20 THEN INVADJF -  INVOF ELSE 
( -  (1 -  TYF( -  l)))/(RRF( -  1))*(  1 +  KADJF*INVADJF/ 248  J. A. FrenkeYA. RazidS. Syrnansky 
(11)KH 
(12)KF 












KF( -  1)) +  (1 -  THETAF)**(20 -  TIME)*(MPKF-  THETA 
+  ALPHAF)/R20F +  SUM(1 = 1 TO 19 : 
(1 -  THETAF)**(I -  1)*(  1 -  TYF(1-  l))/RRF(I -  1)" 
IDUM(I)*(MPKF -  THETAF) +  (1 -  TYF(1-  l))*KADJF/2* 
(INVADJF(I)/KF(I -  1))**2). 
= (1 -  THETAH)*KH( -  1) +  INVADJH. 
= (1 -  THETAF)*KF( -  1) +  INVADJF. 
= INVADJH*( 1 +  KADJH/2*INVADJH/KH( -  1)). 
= INVADJF*(  1 +  KADJF/2* INVADJF/KF( -  1)). 
= WAGEH*(l -TYH). 
= WAGEF*(  1 -  TYF). 
= (1 +TCH). 
= (l+TCF). 
= (1 -  DELTAH)*WH/PH/(  1 -  DELTAH**21)*DELTAH 
*  *TIME*RRH. 
= (1 -  DELTAF)*WF/PF/ 
(1 -  DELTAF**21)*DELTAF**TIME*RRF. 
= PH*UH. 
= PF*UF. 
= IF YEAR() EQ 20 THEN SUM(J =  0 TO 19 : 
((  1 -  TYH(J))*(WAGEH(J) +  (MPKH -  THETAH)*KH(J) 
-  INVH(J + l))/RRH(J))  +  ((  1 -  TYH(20))* 
(WAGEH(20) +  (MPKH -  THETAH)*KH(20) + 
TERKH(20))/ RRH(2O) ELSE WH( -  1). 
= IF YEAR() EQ 20 THEN WF-R+  1 ELSE WF( -  1). 
(25) SURPH = SURPH( -  l)*R( -  1)  +  (TBH*(BPH -  R* 
BPH( -  1)) +  TCH*CH +  TYH*(LH*WAGEH 
+  (MPKH -  THETAH) *KH -  INVH( 1) +  TERKH) -  GH). 
(26) SURPF  = SURPF( -  l)*R( -  1) +  (TBF*(BPF-R*BPF 
( -  1)) +  TCF*CF +  TYF*(LF*WAGEF + 
(MPKF -  THETAF)*KF -  INVF( 1) +  TERKF) -  GF). 
(27)TYH  = TAXDUMH*(IF YEAR() LT  21 THEN TYHBAR ELSE 
(IF YEAR() EQ 21 THEN 
(TERSURPH -  SURPH( -  1) -  SUM(J = 0 TO 19 : 
l/RR(J)*(TBH(J)*(BPH(J) -  R(J)*BPH(J -  1)) +  TCH(J) 249  International Spillovers of  Taxation 
*CH(J) -  GH(J))))/SUM(I = 0 TO 19 : 
(LH(I)*WAGEH(I)  +  (MPKH -  THETAH)*KH(I) 
-INVH(I+  l)+TERKH(I))/RR(I)) ELSE 
TYH( -  1))) +  (1 -  TAXDUMH)*TYHBAR. 
(28)TYF  = TAXDUMF*(IF YEAR() LT 21 THEN TYFBAR ELSE 
(IF YEAR() EQ 21 THEN 
(TERSURPF-  SURPF( -  1) -  SUM(J = 
l/RR(J)*(TBF(J)*(BPF(J) -  R(J)*BPF(J -  1)) 
+  TCF(J)*CF(J) -  GF(J))))/SUM(I = 0 TO 19 : 
(LF(I)*WAGEF(I) +  (MPKF -  THETAF)*KF(I) 
-INVF(I+  l)+TERKF(I))/RR(I)) ELSE TYF(-  1))) 
+  (1 -  TAXDUMF)*TYFBAR. 
0 to  19 : 
(29)TCH  = (1 -TAXDUMH)*(IF  YEAR() LT 21 THEN TCHBAR 
ELSE (IF YEAR() EQ 21 THEN 
(TERSURPH -  SURPH( -  1) -  SUM(J = 0 TO 19 : 
l/RR(J)*(TBH(J)*(BPH(J) -  R(J)*BPH(J -  1)) 
+ TYH(J)*(LH(J)*WAGEH(J)  +  (MPKH -  THETAH)* 
KH(J) -  INVH(J +  1) +  TERKH(J) -  GH(J)))))/SUM(I = 0 
TO  19 : l/RR(I)*CH(I)) ELSE 
TCH( -  1))) +  TAXDUMH*TCHBAR. 
(30) TCF  = (1 -  TAXDUMF)*(IF YEAR() LT  21 THEN TCFBAR 
ELSE (IF YEAR() EQ 21 
THEN(TERSURPF -  SURPF( -  1) -  SUM(J = 0 TO  19 : 
l/RR(J)*(TBF(J)*(BPF(J) -  R(J)*BPF(J -  1)) +  TYF(J) 
*(LF(J)*WAGEF(J)  +  (MPKF -  THETAF)*KF(J) -  INVF(J + 
1) +  TERKF(J) -  GF(J)))))/SUM(I = 0 TO 19 : 
l/RR(I)*CF(I)) ELSE TCF( -  1))) +  TAXDUMF*TCFBAR. 
(31)TBH  = TBTYH*TYH. 
(32)TBF  = TBTYF*TYF. 
(33)TERKH = IF YEAR() LT 40 THEN 0 ELSE ALPHAH*KH. 
(34) TERKF  = IF YEAR() LT 40 THEN 0 ELSE ALPHAF*KF. 
(35)BPH  = ((1 +TCH)*CH-(1  -TYH)*(YH+TERKH- 
INVH(l))(R(-  1)- l)*BPH(-  1))/(1  -TBH)+BPH( -  1). 
(36) BPF  = ((  1 +  TCF)*CF -  (1 -  TYF)*(YF +  TERKF - 
INVF( 1))  +  (R( -  1) -  l)*BPF( -  1))/(  1  -TBF) + 
BPF( -  1). 
(37)VH 
(38)VF 
= SUM(1 = 0 TO 19 : DELTAH**I*LOG(UH(I))). 








= IF YEAR() EQ 20 THEN RR(20)/( 1 -  TYH(20)) ELSE 
R20H( -  1). 
= IF YEAR() EQ 20 THEN RR(20)/( 1 -  TYF(20)) ELSE 
R20F( -  1). 
= EXP(SUM(J= -  19 TO 0 
= EXP(SUM(J  = -  19 TO 0 : 
LOG( 1 -  TBH(J) +  R(J) -  1))). 
LOG( 1 -  TBF(J) +  R(J) -  1))). 
GH +  GF  +  CH +  CF+ INVH( 1) +  INVF(1)  = YH +  YF 
+  TERKH +  TERKF . 
= EXP(SUM(J  = -  19 TO 0 : LOG(R(J)))). 
= CH -  YH +  R( -  l)*BH( -  1) +  INVH( 1) +  GH -  TERKH. 
Equations  (1) and (2) define home  and foreign country  income  as labor 
income  plus  the  return  on  capital.  Equations  (3)-(8)  are  the  behavioral 
equations derived by maximizing utility subject to the lifetime present-value 
budget  constraint.  Equation  (3)  is  the  home  consumption  equation  and 
identical to equation (7) of the main text. Equation (5) is the leisure equation 
and (7) the price equation; they represent equations (8) and (6) of the main 
text. The foreign country equations for these three variables are (4), (6), and 
(8). 
The home  and  foreign  investment  equations,  (9) and  (lo), derived  by 
maximizing wealth,  differ slightly from equation (9) in the main text in  SO 
far as the rate of depreciation (THETA) is included here but omitted from the 
text. Equations (1 1) and (1 2) define the home and foreign capital stocks, and 
equations  (13)  and  (14)  describe  investment  demands  allowing  for  ad- 
justment costs. 
Equations  (15)-(19)  are  definitions  of  tax-adjusted  prices  that  are  then 
substituted in other equations. For example, a comparison of equation (6) of 
the text to equation (7) of the simulation model shows that PCH is used in 
place of (1 + T~~). 
Real  utility-based  expenditures  (eq.  [5]  of  the  text)  are  given  in 
equations (19) and (20), while the values in terms of the consumption good 
of these expenditures are defined in (21) and (22). Home country wealth  is 
defined by equation (23) and is identical to the wealth  equation in the main 
text. A similar equation could be written for foreign wealth, but, by Walras 
law, we have dropped this equation from the model and use the relation to 
solve for the interest rate.  Note that these equations solve for W,,  and R, in 
period  t  = 0 (year 20 in  the computer  model).  However,  for t  = 1 to T, 
these  equations  set  wealth  at  their  previous  values  (i.e.,  WHO  and  WF,) 
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The next eight equations are used to describe government behavior and 
vary  depending on the type of  scenario that we  are simulating. Equations 
(25) and (26) define the home and foreign country's cumulated surplus as tax 
receipts less spending. Various combinations of  the next six equations and 
values for dummy variables are used in the simulations to capture alternative 
tax  and  spending policies.  For  example,  in  the  simulation of  a revenue 
neutral conversion of  consumption for income tax, equations (27) and (29) 
are  dropped  from  the  model,  and  the  income  tax  rate,  TYH,  and  the 
government surplus, SURPH, are assumed exogenous while the consump- 
tion  tax rate,  TCH, can be thought of  as balancing the  government's  net 
revenue position. For the budget deficit simulations, the model is altered in a 
very different way. For example, in order to analyze a current income tax 
shift, the consumption tax equation, (29), is dropped from the model, and 
the consumption tax rate is assumed exogenous. Then an exogenous income 
tax rate is imposed in the relevant years, and equation (27) is used to alter 
future income tax rates so that the budget is balanced by  year T. Analogous 
assumptions can be  made for consumption tax  shifts. Equations (31) and 
(32) define the international borrowing tax rates as described in equation (10) 
in the main text, and the coefficient, TBTYR (0 in the text), can be set in 
order to consider a wide variety of tax conversion policies as a result of  the 
tax equivalence relation between the consumption, income, and international 
borrowing taxes. 
Equations (35) and (36) define the privately held home (foreign) stock of 
international borrowings.  The  definitions of  lifetime  utility  are  given  in 
equations (37) and  (38). Note that,  since the model is  simulated for only 
twenty years, the only relevant calculation for VH and VF is in the first year. 
Also, the utility calculation excludes the final year (T)  because the arbitrary 
choice of  a time horizon may cause somewhat perverse results at time T. 
Equations (39) and (40) define period T's tax-adjusted value of the discount 
factor  used  in  the  investment  equations,  and  (41)  and  (42)  define  the 
tax-adiusted discount factor for all other years. 
The final  three  equations do not  have  home  and  foreign  counterparts. 
Equation (43) is  the  equilibrium condition for world  output; demand for 
world output must equal the supply of  world output. Equation (44) defines 
the  present-value  factor.  Finally,  the  balance of  payments  for  the  home 
country is defined in equation (45). Obviously, the negative of  BH  defines 
the foreign country's balance of payment position. 
The parameter values used in the baseline simulations are p = p* = .4, 
6 = 6" = .97, IT  = IT* = 0.3, r,  = ri  = 0.3, and  ci  = a* = 0.2. For 
intercountry differences in  the parameter values of  the discount factor, we 
use (6 = .95, 6* = .97) or (6 = .97, 6" = .95), while, for intercountry 
differences in the parameter values of the marginal product of capital, we use 
(rk = 0.2, ri  = 0.3) or (rk = 0.3~;  = 0.2). 252  J. A. FrenkeYA. RazidS. Symansky 
Notes 
1. We  are  grateful  to  Mario  Blejer  and  Jonathan  Levin,  who  assisted  us  in 
2.  The definitions of the various statistics are provided in the note to table 6.1. 
3.  The analytical framework underlying the  international-intertemporal  approach 
to open-economy macroeconomics is based on Frenkel and Razin (1987, 1988b). For 
an analogous approach developed  in a closed economy context,  see Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff (1987). The tax systems in many countries include incentives to saving and 
investment  and  thereby  contain  important  features  of  the  cash  flow  income  tax 
system.  Suppose  that  the  underlying  income  tax  system  is  represented  by  the 
following modification of the right-hand side of eq. (1): 
obtaining the data and the interpretation of the various accounting measures. 
where  T,,  and  T~~  denote  the  tax  rates  on  labor  income  and  capital  income, 
respectively,  and  T~~ and  T,~  denote  investment-tax  credit  and  saving-tax  credit, 
respectively. Then  the tax configuration T/,  = T, = TJ(I  + TJ yields a cash flow 
income tax system. 
4.  Our formulation reflects the assumption that, except for the final period, bolted 
capital cannot be consumed. However, in the final period, the capital stock, KT, can 
be transformed into consumption at the rate equals to aK,,  where 0 G a  1. This 
assumption serves to mitigate abrupt changes in the behavior of the economy arising 
in  the final period of  the  finite horizon  model.  Accordingly, the  budget constraint 
applicable to the final period (period 2") is analogous to the one shown in eq. (1) with 
an  added  term  on  the  right-hand  side equal  to a(K,-,  + IT-)) =  aK,.  For  a 
formulation of a model highlighting the interaction between investment, government 
spending  policies,  and  international  interdependence  within  an  infinite  horizon 
model, see Buiter (1987). 
5.  A  detailed  analysis  of  the  various  equivalence  relations  in  international 
macroeconomics and their policy implications is contained in Auerbach, Frenkel, and 
Rain (1989). 
6.  Obviously, with more than two periods, these discount factors are replaced by 
the appropriate present-value factors. 
7.  The  investment  behavior  could  have  been  generalized  to  include  the 
depreciation  of  the  capital  stock.  The  simulation  model  used  in  this  paper  and 
described in the appendix includes capital depreciation. 
8. This analysis is based on Frenkel and Razin (1989). 
9.  In terms of the utility function, this assumption amounts to setting p = 1 in eq. 
(3).  The simulation  analysis relaxes  these  assumptions by  considering multiperiod 
simulations with a variable labor supply. 
10. We  are indebted to Alan Auerbach for suggesting this diagram. 
11. These considerations imply that, in the neighborhood of  a flat path of income 
tax,  if  the  intertemporal  income tax  ratio exceeds  unity,  then the CC  schedule  is 
flatter than the RR schedule (assuming an initial-period trade-balance deficit). This is 
the case shown in fig, 6.6. 
12. It can be verified that the quantitative results of the tax conversion remain the 
same if  the intertemporal  income tax ratio falls short of unity, though in the latter 
case the slopes of the CC and the  11 schedules are reversed (but the  I1 schedule is 
flatter than the RR schedule in the neighborhood of  -ry,/-ryq  = 1). 
13. To facilitate the diagrammatic  exposition,  we continue to assume that labor 
supply is  fixed  (so that  p =  1 in eq.  [3]).  The diagrammatic  analysis  could  also 253  International Spillovers of Taxation 
allow for variable labor supply if  leisure and ordinary consumption are separable in 
the utility function as in Frenkel and Razin (1987). 
14.  This follows from the fact that in equilibrium the denominators of ps  and pd 
are equal to each other. Thus, if  the domestic economy runs a trade surplus in the 
second period, then C,  +  Y1,  and, since C  +  C;  =  Y1 +  G,  it follows that 
15.  In  the  subsequent  analysis,  we  find  it  convenient  to  set  the  international 
borrowing tax, T~,  equal to zero and to use explicitly the consumption and income tax 
rates rather than using the equivalence relations as in section 6.2.1. 
16. Our  assumptions  that  the  initial  undistorted  equilibrium  was  with  a 
current-account balance imply that the real-income effects induced by the departure 
from the flat tax pattern and by changes in the world rate of interest are dominated by 
the substitution effect. 
bd < ps. 
17. To verify this point, we note that 
where  a  “hat”  denotes  a  proportional  change  in  the  variable.  Accordingly,  the 
proportional change in the world relative demand is composed of  two components. 
The first consists of the product of the proportional  change of the domestic relative 
demand and a fraction (the relative share of current-period home consumption in the 
world  consumption),  and  the  second  consists  of  the  product  of  the  proportional 
change in future-period consumption  and a term measuring the difference between 
the  relative  shares  of  current  and  future-period  home  consumption  in  world 
consumption. This latter bracketed term reflects the difference between the domestic 
and foreign saving propensities. If the current-period trade-balance deficit arises from 
a relatively lo~  domestic saving propensity, then this bracketed term is positive.  We 
also note that C  is negative since the change in the time profile of consumption taxes 
induces a substitution away from future-period consumption.  It follows that, under 
such circumstances, Bw  < 6 and, therefore, the displacement of the D”  schedule is 
smaller than that of the D schedule. 
18. This analysis is based on Frenkel and Razin (1988a). 
19.  Recall that, in developing fig. 6.7, we have used for simplicity a two-period 
model  with  fixed  labor  supply  (so  that  p = 1  in  eq.  [3]).  As  before,  these 
assumptions are relaxed in the dynamic-simulation model. 
20.  In performing the simulations, we allow for a variable labor supply. Thus, we 
assume that p < 1 in eq. (8). Our simulations are based on the assumption that the 
elasticity of  substitution between consumption and leisure, u,  is smaller than unity. 
The time path of employment following a current-period cut in consumption tax rates 
may be reversed if this elasticity was assumed to exceed unity. 
21. Zero-rated products involve the reimbursement of taxes levied on inputs with 
the result that the final good is completely untaxed. 
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COIllment  Willem H. Buiter 
Working through this interesting paper by Frenkel, Razin, and Symansky was 
a very  useful  investment of  time and  effort.  Like Oliver Twist,  a  typical 
discussant will always ask for “some more.” My comments are no exception. 
The paper consists of three parts. Part 1 considers some empirical material 
on the tax structures of the major seven OECD countries. Part 2 contains a 
small analytical model that  is used  to evaluate various changes in the tax 
structure in a small open economy and in a two-country world. Part 3 goes 
through the same kinds of exercises using a numerical simulation model that 
is a generalization of the analytical model of section 6.1. My comments will 
deal mainly with  part  2, the analytical model.  Some brief remarks on the 
data section are, however, in order. 
The Data 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 and table 6.1 of  the Frenkel-Razin-Symansky paper 
(henceforth FRS) provide some stylized facts concerning average tax rates 
(both total and disaggregated) for the seven major industrial countries since 
the early 1970s. This suggests that there is considerable cross-sectional and 
time-series  variation in  the importance of  different taxes and  in  the total 
tax burden.  As regards the latter, the secular increase since World  War  I1 
came to an end around  1981-82,  as can be  seen from table C6.1. While 
there has been no significant reduction in the total tax burden (the sum of 
direct  and  indirect  taxes  and  social  security  contributions  paid  by 
employers and employees collected by  general government as a percentage 
Willem Buiter is professor of  economics  at Yale University  and a research associate of  the 
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Table C6.1  Total Outlays and Current Receipts of General Government as 
Percentage of GDP 
1967  1982  1986 
United States: 
Outlays  30.5  36.5  36.9 























































Source; OECD Economic Outlook 44 (December 1988), tables R14, R15 
of  GDP),  the roughly stationary shares of  general government revenue and 
expenditure in  GDP since the early  1980s represent a  major economic and 
political change. 
It is recognized by the authors that the average tax rates bear no obvious 
relation to the marginal rates that provide the incentives  that govern labor 
demand and supply, saving, capital formation, and portfolio allocation. 
These  marginal  tax  rates  too  are  characterized  by  considerable  cross- 
sectional and time-series variation. For example,  in  1986 the top marginal 
rate of  the personal  income tax  was 38 percent  in the United  States, 76.5 
percent  in Japan, 60  percent  in the  United  Kingdom,  56  percent  in West 
Germany, and 65 percent in Italy. The top marginal income tax rate in the 
United Kingdom had come down from 83 percent (99 percent for unearned 
income) and was lowered in 1988 to 40 percent. 
When there are many  different taxes,  some of  which apply to the same 
base (e.g., wage income taxes and social security contributions) while others 
apply to distinct bases, their combined effect on behavior is what matters. 
Indeed, for a proper appreciation of the incentive effects and distributional 
consequences of  the  budget,  we must  look jointly  at  the  tax  and  benefit 
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tax rates (occasionally in excess of  100 percent) come from the interaction of 
the tax and benefit systems. In many industrial countries, a “poverty  trap” 
exists when  at low  levels of  income a small increase in earned income is 
effectively nullified by  a significant loss of  benefits and a high  “starting” 
marginal tax rate. The “Why  work?”  phenomenon refers to the possibility 
that the choice between low-paid employment and unemployment is decided 
in favor of the latter through the combined effect of  unemployment benefit, 
income tax, and social security. 
Table C6.2 shows how  the  “total”  marginal tax  rate  on  average wages 
differed in the seven main industrial countries in  1986. 
The marginal tax rates (or tax-net-of-benefit rates) that we can read off the 
tax and benefit laws and regulations may not represent the relevant economic 
signals if  there is significant scope for tax avoidance. 
Finally, even the exhaustive public-spending part of  the budget will have 
potentially important distributional and incentive effects. For instance, public 
expenditure on  health  and  education,  provided  free of  charge,  represents 
income in kind to private agents and may be a direct substitute for or com- 
plement to private spending. Some of  this public expenditure may have the 
characteristics of a national public good, an international public good, a local 
public good, or a conventional private good. Different income groups benefit 
differentially from public expenditure on defense and on law and order. 
Note that, while the exhaustive expenditure side of the budget will obviously 
affect private behavior through income (or wealth) effects, it is quite possible 
that it also affects relevant private static or intertemporal terms of trade. 
The empirical material of part  1 is not sufficiently rich to give us a sense 
of the cross-sectional or time-series variation in the “net”  effects of general 
government budgets on the incentives to work, save, invest, and bear risk or 
on the distribution of  income. In the theoretical parts of  the paper, all taxes 
are assumed to be levied at given proportional or “flat”  rates. There is no 
progressivity or regressivity, no exemptions, tax credits, leads and lags, etc. 
Even so, the analysis can get rather involved. Modeling descriptively realistic 
tax-benefit-expenditure structures appears to be a daunting task indeed. 
Table C6.2  Marginal Tax Rates on Average Wages under 1986 Tax Systems” 
United States  40.9 
Japan  31.5 
Germany  62.7 
France  51.2 
Italy  57.8 
Canada  33.7 
United Kingdom  43.9 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 41 (June 1987), table  16. 
aOverall marginal tax rate for an average (unmarried) production  worker,  allowing for direct 
taxes  at  all  levels  of  government,  social  security  contributions  by  both  employees  and 
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The Analytical Model 
In  the  small  open  economy  case,  there  is  a  single  (finite-lived) 
representative household-worker-producer. There is one traded good that can 
be  used  for  private  consumption,  private  investment,  or  export.  Public 
consumption or  investment is  not  considered explicitly. There  is  a  fixed 
endowment each  period  of  a  single  nontraded  good.  This  can  be  either 
consumed (leisure) or combined with capital to produce the traded good. The 
production function of the traded good is linear, and the marginal products of 
labor and capital are fixed at w and r,,  respectively. 
A competitive equilibrium with the domestic interest rate, r, fixed by  the 
assumption of  perfect international capital mobility and a parametric world 
rate of  interest, would result in comer solutions for the capital stock (unless 
r = r,).  The assumption of  quadratic internal adjustment costs to  invest- 
ment  guarantees  an  interior  solution  for  the  capital  stock,  while  the 
competitive wage rate remains independent of the capital-labor ratio. 
The multiperiod utility function is time additive and logarithmic, while the 
single-period  utility  function  is  a  C.E.S.  function  of  traded  goods 
consumption and leisure. 
Without  loss  of  generality,  the  private  sector  is  assumed  to  hold  no 
domestic government debt,  and  (with  some  loss of  generality) the  initial 
external debt is assumed to equal zero. 
There are three taxes, each levied at a constant proportional rate in any 
given period but potentially differing between periods. The taxes are labeled 
consumption tax  (or VAT),  (cash  flow) income  tax,  and  tax  on  external 
private borrowing. These labels are rather misleading. 
The “consumption tax”  is a tax on the private consumption of the traded 
good  only.  Leisure,  the  nontraded  good,  is  not  taxed.  A  comprehensive 
flat-rate consumption tax would fall equally on the private consumption of 
traded  and  nontraded  goods  and  on  public  consumption.  Henceforth, 
consumption denotes private consumption of traded goods only. 
The “cash flow income tax” is a tax on domestic factor income (GDP) minus 
investment expenditure. This is of course identically equal to consumption plus 
exhaustive public spending plus the trade balance surplus. With zero public 
spending, it is a tax on consumption plus the trade balance surplus. 
The  tax  on  private  external  borrowing is  in  fact  a  tax  on  the  private 
external primary (noninterest) deficit (i.e., private external borrowing minus 
interest paid  on  the  external  private  debt).  With  a  balanced  government 
budget, the external primary deficit of  the private  sector equals the trade 
deficit. We  therefore have (in each period) proportional taxes on consump- 
tion, on consumption plus the trade balance surplus, and on the trade balance 
deficit. The  fact  that  any  linear combination of  these three taxes can  be 
reproduced by  some linear combination of  any two of the three is therefore 
not surprising. I will restrict attention in what follows to the consumption tax 
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In  the  special case of  the two-period  model  with  inelastic  labor supply, 
most of  the  single-country  analysis can be  obtained  directly  from the  two 
intertemporal  first-order conditions  or ‘‘Euler equations” governing private 
consumption and investment. 
If  the  instantaneous  utility  function  is  u(c),  the  optimal  intertemporal 
consumption choice is characterized by 
In the logarithmic utility case (u[c]  = Inc), this implies 
One plus the growth rate of consumption is increasing in the “consumption 
interest factor”  (1  +  ro)[(l  +  ~,~)/(1  +  T~])].  In the small open econ- 
omy, ro is exogenous, and  the  growth rate  of  consumption  increases with 
(1  +  ~~~)/(l  +  -rCl).  A higher value of  (1  +  ~$(l +  T,~)  increases 
the opportunity cost of consuming today. 




I  - -[(-)(-)  1  a + r,  1 -  7Yl  - 1]K,. 
O-b  l+ro  l-~~, 
With both r,  and ro exogenous  and KO predetermined,  a higher value of 
T~,  relative to T~~ raises the effective (after-tax) investment rate of interest and 
reduces investment. 
If  we want cI and co separately rather than just c,/co,  it is easily checked 
that 
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Since for consumption growth all that matters is T,~  /  .rCland  for investment 
all  that  matters  is  T~,  /T~~,  the  analysis  of  the  consequences  of  a 
balanced-budget  switch  from  a  consumption  tax  to  a  cash-flow  tax  is 
straightforward. 
If  the  first-period  equilibrium  is  characterized  by  a  trade  deficit, 
first-period consumption exceeds first-period cash  flow, and second-period 
consumption is less than second-period cash flow. If  T,~  and T,~  were reduced 
by a common percentage and T~~ and T~,  increased by  a common percentage 
(so as to maintain public-sector solvency over the two-period horizon), there 
would be a first-period budget deficit and a second-period budget surplus. To 
maintain period-by-period budget balance, we must reduce T,~  proportionally 
by  less than T,~  and increase T~~ proportionally by  more than T~~.  If  follows 
immediately that c,Ic,  and I, rise. With a little work, it can also be shown 
that c,  falls. 
In a two-country setting (with a single traded good), the world interest rate 
becomes endogenous. Assume that the home country, which undergoes the 
balanced-budget move  from a consumption tax  to  a cash-flow tax,  has  a 
first-period trade deficit (say, because it has a higher subjective rate of  time 
preference, a higher marginal product of capital, or a lower adjustment cost 
coefficient). The single-country analysis showed that, at a given interest rate, 
the home  country wishes  to  switch resources to  the  future by  increasing 
saving and investment. In the world economy, this reduces the interest rate, 
boosting foreign investment and reducing foreign consumption growth. The 
decline in  ro further  stimulates home  country investment and reduces the 
increase in consumption growth but does not reverse it; that is,  (1  +  ro) 
[(  1  +  T,~)/(  1  +  T,~)]  increases. In an overlapping generations model, the 
decline  in  r,  could  be  strong  enough  to  reduce  (1  + r,)  [(l  +  T,~)/ 
(1  +  T,,)]  despite the increase in  (1  +  T,~)/(I +  T,~)  (this is an open 
economy version of the result shown in Diamond [  19701). 
An  “unbalanced budget”  (but solvency consistent) cut in T,~  followed by 
an increase in T,~  can again be analyzed directly from equations (2) and (4). 
At  a given value of  r,,  the growth rate of  consumption falls,  while I, is 
unaffected. In a two-country world, the world interest rate rises, depressing 
capital formation at home and abroad, raising foreign consumption growth 
and mitigating the decline in home country consumption growth. 
“Tax  harmonization”  in  the  two-country  model  is  the  sum  of  two 
balanced  budget  tax  conversions,  in  the  home  country  a  move  toward  a 
lower consumption tax rate and a higher cash-flow tax rate and in the foreign 
country a move in the opposite direction. No new analytics are involved. 
Other Assorted Comments 
1. A minor technical problem with the current presentation of the model is 
that  government  revenue  “disappears.”  The  government’s  intertemporal 
budget constraint or solvency constraint is not explicitly substituted into the 
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responses. There is no government spending on goods and services, and the 
proceeds from the distortionary taxes are not returned (in lump-sum fashion 
or otherwise) to the private sector. The analysis is therefore strictly valid 
only for (small) tax rate changes evaluated “at zero.” 
2. The analysis proceeds as if  a cut in tax rates always reduces revenue 
from the tax in question. This is correct in the FRS model for consumption 
tax  cuts  and  for  equal  proportional  cuts  in  cash-flow  tax  rates  in  both 
periods. It is not obviously true if  T~,  alone is cut since this boosts I,,  which 
might raise cash flow in period 1 by enough to raise cash-flow tax receipts in 
period  1  despite the cut in T~,.  With endogenous labor supply (the general 
case  considered  in  the  simulation  exercises),  the  scope  for  Laffer-style 
phenomena is enhanced. 
3. It would be interesting (and in my  view essential for a policy relevant 
analysis) to extend the analysis beyond the representative agent case with its 
maintained  hypothesis  of  first-order debt  neutrality.  Samuelson-Diamond 
OLG  models  or  the  Blanchard-Yaari  version  of  the  OLG  model  are  the 
natural vehicles for carrying out a rich analysis of changes in tax structure 
with and without balanced budgets. Frenkel and Razin have pioneered the 
application of these models to international tax questions (see, e.g.,  Frenkel 
and Razin 1987), and I hope that in further work on the topics covered in the 
FRS paper they will take the key step of  moving beyond the representative 
agent paradigm. My own analysis of a proportional tax on the income from 
labor and capital in  open,  interdependent economies (Buiter  1989) shows 
that qualitatively different results can be obtained (even in a balanced budget 
setting) if  we move from a representative agent to an OLG setting. 
4. For a policy-oriented analysis, the introduction of endogenous terms of 
trade (i.e.,  at least two traded goods) is important.  Part of  the real-world 
debate about the switch from conventional income taxes to a VAT  concerns 
the  effects  of  such  a  change on  international competitiveness (see,  e.g., 
Feldstein and Krugman, in this volume). While the model of the FRS paper 
can be used to analyze the consequences of  tax conversions of  this kind on 
the  relative sizes of  the  traded  and  nontraded  goods  sectors (in  the  case 
where the supply of  labor is not exogenous), it cannot be used to address 
questions concerning effects on the production of  exportables and import- 
competing goods and on the terms of  trade. Engel and Kletzer (1987) have 
demonstrated the importance of the specification of savings behavior for the 
determination of  the effects of  a tariff (a tax on the consumption of  and an 
equal proportional subsidy on the production of importables) on the external 
accounts. A similar sensitivity of the behavior of the external accounts (and 
of  the  sectoral  allocation  of  resources)  to  alternative  assumptions  about 
savings  behavior  can  be  expected  for  other  changes  in  the  structure  of 
taxation, transfers, and subsidies. 
5. The consumption tax of the FRS paper is a reasonable ideal type of a 
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goods  sector.  The  other  two  taxes,  however,  cannot  be  described  as 
reasonable approximations to real-world taxes,  nor  do they  correspond to 
traditional public finance ideal types such as an ideal consumption tax (equal 
proportional taxes on the consumption of  traded and nontraded goods in all 
periods) or a Hicks-Simons comprehensive income tax. 
Instead of a tax conversion from the FRS  cash-flow tax to a consumption 
tax, it might be more informative to consider switches between conventional 
taxes on the income from labor and capital (or employers’ social security 
taxes) and a consumption tax. The tax on the external primary deficit of the 
private sector also has (as far as I know) no close real-world counterpart. It 
would be useful to analyze changes in the taxation of foreign asset income, 
perhaps as part  of  a general review  of  source- versus residence-based tax 
systems. 
6. Finally,  when  considering tax  harmonization (or the convergence of 
VAT rates and income tax rates among nations), it is important to realize that 
the argument in the European Community about this issue is part of  a wider 
debate about the  merits of  competition between fiscal jurisdictions  versus 
harmonization  or  uniformity.  A  proper  understanding  requires  the  joint 
consideration of  exhaustive  public-spending and  tax-transfer-subsidy pro- 
grams.  The right  perspective involves extensions of  the  theories of  fiscal 
federalism, the theory of clubs, and the theory of local public goods. One of 
the authors of  the FRS paper also contributed to this subject at this very 
conference (Razin and Sadka, in this volume). Issues such as the mobility of 
factors of production, of  owners of factors of production, and of taxpayers and 
benefit recipients relative to the span of control of national fiscal authorities 
must be considered when this wider approach to fiscal harmonization is pur- 
sued. 
The FRS paper is a useful first step toward a dynamic general equilibrium 
analysis of changes in tax structures in open interdependent economies. 
References 
Buiter, W. H. 1989. Budgetary policy, international and  intertemporal  trade  in  the 
Diamond, P.  1970. Incidence of an interest income tax. Journal of Economic Theory 
Engel,  C., and  K. Kletzer.  1987.  Tariffs, saving and  the  current  account. NBER 
Working  Paper  no.  1869.  Cambridge,  Mass.:  National  Bureau  of  Economic 
Research. 
Frenkel, J. A., and A. Razin. Fiscal policy and the world economy: An intertempo- 
ral approach. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
global economy. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
2:211-24. This Page Intentionally Left Blank